Housing versus Immigration to the United Kingdom: an overview review
A summary of state failure over Britain's housing and migration crisis.

An Overview Review: Housing vs Immigration to the UK
Britain’s housing crisis is multivariate in nature, however an Occam's Razor approach naturally points to the significant imbalance between supply and demand as the primary driver.
Between 2001 and 2024, net migration has accounted for the vast majority of Britain's population growth - between 60 to 82%, according to the Migration Observatory and Full Fact.4
Existing studies project that, from 2021 to 2046, net migration will contribute to 92% of the UK's population growth, pushing the population to 77 million.5
Since 2003 (excluding the 2020 Covid-19 lockdown), the UK has built fewer new homes each year than the number of people arriving through net migration (Figure 1: Marker 1).
This reflects at least twenty consecutive years of government failure and misallocation of resources.
While not all immigrants require a home of their own (as many are willing to share in HMOs), the ratio of new homes built versus net migration is an important indicator of the pressures that migration places on our infrastructure and public services - highlighting the challenge of keeping pace with demand.
In 1977, the ratio of immigrants arriving to new homes built pa was 1:2 (Figure 2: Marker 1); by 1998, the ratio of immigrants arriving to new homes built pa had flipped to 2:1 (Figure 2: Marker 2).
1988 was the last year the UK built more new homes than the number of immigrants arriving (Figure 1: Marker 2), highlighting nearly 40 years of one-directional immigration trends and multiple generations of cross-party political inaction and undelivered promises.6
Emblematic of Uniparty failure, both the Conservative and Labour Governments have set—and missed—their national house-building targets of 300,000 new homes per year by the mid-2020s.78
The last time the UK reached the 300,000 figure was almost fifty years ago in 1977, when 314,000 new homes were built (Figure 1: Marker 3), and net migration then was running at negative.
Moreover, 1981 was the last time the state through its local authorities built more than 50,000 units of new housing (Figure 3: Marker 1). Since then state capacity for house building has dropped to little more than a rounding-error.
Even if 'stable' net migration of 200-300 thousand annually had been planned for and managed by local authorities and the national government—addressing the growing demand on housing, infrastructure, transport, health, and education—it is unlikely that Britain’s public services will cope with the pressures of the post-2021 'Boris-Patel-wave' influx of over one million+ immigrants per year (Figure 1: Marker 4).
Moreover, the lack of apology or repentance from the former Home Secretary, Priti Patel has been galling.9
Despite missing its targets by a substantial margin, Britain has still managed to build just over two million new homes in the decade leading up to 2024.
It is debatable whether this is remotely sufficient to accommodate just the net migration of those years alone.
Even if it were, is it a wise use of industrial capacity and labor to focus on housing dependents and increasing publicly-funded social housing for first-generation immigrants?10 (Especially, when immigration has been consistently sold to the public as positive for the economy..)
While immigration dominates much of the housing crisis analysis, the full picture recognizes that other factors, such as interest rates that have also contributed to rising house prices (and rents) relative to average wages.11
The work to develop a complete set of indicators to quantify the extent of the housing crisis is still ongoing.
Addressing the imbalance between housing supply and demand is not the sole solution to restoring Britain’s productivity and prosperity, but it is a crucial part of the broader challenge that mass migration presents to our public services and the country’s future.
The key indicators and research highlighted in this review represent only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the impact that unchecked immigration has had on the fabric of modern Britain.


References
ONS Housing Analysis Team (2023). UK house building: permanent dwellings started and completed - Office for National Statistics. [online] www.ons.gov.uk. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/housing/datasets/ukhousebuildingpermanentdwellingsstartedandcompleted.
James, M. (2020). Long-term international migration 2.00, citizenship, UK - Office for National Statistics. [online] www.ons.gov.uk. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/longterminternationalmigration200citizenshipuk.
ONS Migration Statistics Team (2023). Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration flows, provisional - Office for National Statistics. [online] www.ons.gov.uk. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/longterminternationalimmigrationemigrationandnetmigrationflowsprovisional.
Full Fact (2020). Migration drives the majority of UK population growth—exactly how much is debatable - Full Fact. [online] Full Fact. Available at: https://fullfact.org/immigration/migration-population-growth-80-one-million/ [Accessed 3 Feb. 2025].
Cangiano, A. (2023). The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth - Migration Observatory. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-impact-of-migration-on-uk-population-growth/.
Thdhmo. (2022). The “we were never asked” thread about immigration. [online] x.com. Available at: https://x.com/t848m0/status/1560662923101347840 [Accessed 3 Feb. 2025].
Savage, M. (2021). Tories’ manifesto pledge to build 300,000 houses a year now ‘almost impossible’. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2021/oct/10/tories-manifesto-pledge-to-build-300000-houses-a-year-now-almost-impossible.
Labiak, M. (2024). Labour’s plan to build 1.5m homes – can it be delivered? [online] BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgw7x4y5rzo.
Hill, H. (2025). Tories still won’t confront failure of Boriswave. [online] UnHerd. Available at: https://unherd.com/newsroom/tories-still-wont-confront-failure-of-boriswave/ [Accessed 3 Feb. 2025].
JUICE Data. (2023). The Social Housing Phenomenon. [online] Pimlicojournal.co.uk. Available at: https://www.pimlicojournal.co.uk/p/the-social-housing-phenomenon [Accessed 3 Feb. 2025].
Sterngold, J. (2024). The two-sided impact of interest rates on the housing market. [online] LGT Wealth Management. Available at: https://www.lgtwm.com/uk-en/insights/market-views/the-two-sided-impact-of-interest-rates-on-the-housing-market-211968.